The problem, of course, is that a whole generation of generals cannot come to terms with the end of the mass-mobilization army. Their livelihood and careers depend on the continuation of a huge, conscript army. The only way they know how to fight a war is in the Soviet fashion — by throwing an endless stream of expendable recruits before enemy guns.

And these generals have plenty of allies who are willing to use all available resources to fight Serdyukov’s reforms. Deputy head of the General Staff Vasily Smirnov  is leading these efforts. He created a sensation two weeks ago when he spoke at the Federation Council. First, Smirnov said the upper limit for conscription should be raised from 27 to 30 years of age. Second, the annual spring call-up should be extended to Aug. 1. Third, 70 percent of all institutions of higher learning should lose the right to grant deferments, which would make it possible to draft first- and second-year students from most universities and institutes. Finally, Smirnov wants to change the rule under which every draftee must sign his draft notice to acknowledge receipt. Why not, Smirnov suggested, simply text them the notice by cell phone and then prosecute them for failure to appear at their local draft board?

But Smirnov and other dreamers of mass-mobilization paradise ignore a plain but stubborn fact: Even with all of the toughened measures to increase draft numbers, it will be all but impossible to recruit 750,000 conscript soldiers annually — the minimum number of recruits needed to maintain more than 1 million personnel and to create the semblance of a mass-mobilization army. This is because the number of young men between the ages of 18 and 27 (and even 18 and 30 for that matter) is decreasing and will continue to decrease for the next 10 years. Moreover, experience has shown over the past 19 years that the more the government tries to tighten the rules on increasing the draft numbers, the smarter and bolder potential draftees and their families become in dodging the draft — either “legally” by purchasing the necessary documents, or illegally if need be. If things get tough enough, many young men will simply leave Russia until they reach 30 to avoid being drafted. For those with money, this could mean going to the West to study or work. For those with less money, this could mean taking an extended “leave-of-absence” to Ukraine.

Smirnov’s tough position on strengthening draftee procedures severely undermined Serdyukov’s authority. Just a week before Smirnov’s comments, Serdyukov met with representatives of civic organizations and won them over with promises of how the army would “humanize” military service. Conscripts will have weekends off, and they will not have to cook, clean the barracks or collect cigarette butts off the ground. And then came the truly amazing news of the abolition of the extraterritorial principle of forming units so that now soldiers will be able to serve close to home. Serdyukov did not even hint at the possibility that the screws may be tightened on draftees. Surprisingly, in a visit Medvedev made to the elite Taman mechanized infantry brigade after Smirnov’s revelations, the president acted as if nothing at all had been said. Instead, he and Surdyukov waxed eloquent about how convenient military service would be.

The military top brass received a huge boost from Medvedev after their commander-in-chief hinted in the Izvestia interview that Russia may very well have to prepare for another world war. This may give the die-hard defenders of the mass-mobilization army a new lease on life and boost their efforts to derail Serdyukov’s reforms once and for all.

**Alexander Golts is deputy editor of the online newspaper Yezhednevny Zhurnal.