The Department of Defense agreed to hold a dialogue with their Chinese counterparts in the near future in the hopes of averting future incidents and establishing procedures to resolve them. This is a positive step. However, a number of disconcerting trends call into question the efficacy of U.S. policy in the region and highlight a dilemma for the United States that will only deepen over time.

Chinese territorial claims over the South China Sea and its islands and atolls overlap with those of a number of Southeast Asian nations. The volume of trade carried through its waters make it of vital strategic importance in Asia, while resource competition and military expansion have the potential to generate conflict.

The latest maritime incidents are reflective of a more assertive stance from Beijing in recent years and come as China oversees the impressive modernization of its naval capabilities. Beijing only recently renewed pressures on its conflicting territorial claims with the Philippines and Vietnam (and on plans by Western oil companies to extract resources in the area), throwing into doubt a 2002 agreement on managing tensions in the region. China's response to the Impeccable incident was also troubling, with a Foreign Ministry spokesman arguing against international law in maintaining that American ships needed "permission" to enter into China's Exclusive Economic Zone.

Nevertheless, the American response to these provocative acts was positively mild. The government did nothing stronger than to lodge a complaint with the Chinese government after the Impeccable incident, and declared the submarine collision to be inadvertent, declining to make it an open issue. These reactions were clearly designed to keep the incidents from imperiling Washington's larger agenda with Beijing. In fact, U.S. stated policy on South China Sea territorial disputes is similarly cautious and has not changed since the mid-1990s, when the U.S. asserted it would not take a stance on any territorial claim and would urge a non-assertive environment for the peaceful resolution of differences.

Such an approach reveals a crucial dilemma in America's strategy towards China. The U.S. has pursued what some have called "strategic hedging," seeking to induce Chinese cooperation on a range of shared interests, while simultaneously preparing for the possibility that China will choose confrontation. Yet, given the desire to preserve relations with Beijing and to avoid feeding tensions, the U.S. prefers that its military deterrent be more implicit than explicit. The hope is that sober minds in Beijing, who understand the need for a peaceful international environment for economic growth, will prevail.

However, American strategy in this instance fails to appreciate Chinese calculations in the South China Sea. The primary concern is not that China would make a strategically disastrous choice to confront the United States head-on there. Rather, China might act aggressively -- perhaps through economic and military pressure on its southern neighbors -- if it believes that it can limit U.S. opposition and international fallout.

Elements in the Chinese government are clearly emboldened by recent trends. The Global Times, a central government mouthpiece, recently ran an article stating that 92 percent of internet users think the South China Sea dispute will have to be resolved by force, suggesting that military action would be an attractive option for distracting from any eventual domestic troubles. A think tank subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department called this month for mounting a military campaign that would "strike at the arrogance of one or two small nations, realistically recover a few strategic islands and reefs, including with strikes against illegal oil wells." The decisive factor, in their view, was that the United States lacked the will to oppose military action. If not disabused of these notions, the PLA and others will continue to see opportunity where there is only danger.

To address these misconceptions, the U.S. must clarify its commitments to defending the South China Sea against aggression. At the same time, it must tread carefully to reduce to the greatest extent possible a Chinese backlash, while allowing space for Beijing to rein in those advocating confrontation.

The Defense Department should use the planned talks on maritime issues to convey America's resolve to maintain its presence in the South China Sea. Yet, because this issue is larger than just maritime incidents, these efforts must be followed by other measures. A high-profile public address from a top State or Defense Department official should explain American interests in the region -- including freedom of navigation through this vital part of the global commons, and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes -- and reaffirm the United States' willingness to protect those interests. The U.S. should also strengthen security relationships with its Southeast Asian partners.

At the same time, the United States should make clear that it does not oppose China's legitimate presence in the area, and invite Chinese participation in a greater range of maritime security missions against piracy and proliferation. This combination of measures will bolster American deterrence while encouraging Chinese integration into a cooperative security architecture.

Some in the U.S. may be uncomfortable bringing greater "strategic clarity" to this region. In coming decades, however, the PLA will gain the ability to project power to the farthest ends of the South China Sea. If the Chinese have not learned the limits of force and provocation before then, it will be difficult for strategic hedging not to evolve into containment.

**Micah Springut is a Joseph S. Nye, Jr. National Security Intern at the Center for a New American Security.